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Abstract
A key challenge in estimating the infection fatality rate (IFR) of COVID-19 is deter-
mining the total number of cases. The total number of cases is not known because
not everyone is tested but also, more importantly, because tested individuals are
not representative of the population at large. We refer to the phenomenon whereby
infected individuals are more likely to be tested than non-infected individuals, as
“preferential testing.” An open question is whether or not it is possible to reliably
estimate the IFR without any specific knowledge about the degree to which the
data are biased by preferential testing. In this paper we take a partial identifiabil-
ity approach, formulating clearly where deliberate prior assumptions can be made
and presenting a Bayesian model, which pools information from different samples.
Results suggest that when limited knowledge is available about the magnitude of
preferential testing, reliable estimation of the IFR is still possible so long as there is
sufficient “heterogeneity of bias” across samples.
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1. Introduction
If someone is infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2), the pathogen that causes COVID-19, how likely is that person to die of
COVID-19? This simple question is surprisingly difficult to answer.
The “case fatality rate” (CFR) is a common measure that quantifies the mortality
risk in a certain population, and is given by the ratio of deaths (D) over confirmed
cases (CC) during a specific time period. However, because many COVID-19 cases
are never diagnosed, the CFR almost certainly overestimates the true lethality of the
virus. Instead, the better answer is captured by the infection fatality rate (IFR) (Wong
et al., 2013; Kobayashi et al., 2020). The IFR, also a simple ratio, differentiates itself
from the CFR by considering all cases, including the asymptomatic, undetected and
misdiagnosed infections, in the denominator. For instance, if 20 individuals die of the
disease in a population with 1000 infections, then the IFR is 20 / 1000 = 0.02 = 2%.
Evidently, a key challenge in calculating the IFR is determining the true total
number of cases. The total number of cases (C) is not known because not everyone is
tested in the population (P ). A na¨ıve estimate of the IFR might take this into account
by simply considering the number of tests (T ) and estimating the number of cases as:
C ≈ (CC/T ) × P . However, diagnostic tests are often selectively initiated, such that
tested individuals are not representative of the population at large.
In most countries/jurisdictions, those with classic COVID-19 symptoms (e.g.
fever, dry cough, loss of smell or taste) are much more likely to be tested than those
without symptoms. Due to this severity bias, the reported number of cases likely in-
cludes mostly people whose symptoms were severe enough to be tested and excludes
the vast majority of those who are mildly- or asymptomatic. Even when testing is
made equally available to all individuals (e.g., Bendavid et al. (2020)), there is po-
tential for “selection bias” if people who have reason to believe they are infected are
more likely to volunteer to be tested. We refer to the phenomenon whereby infected
individuals are more likely to be tested than non-infected individuals, as “preferential
testing.” (Hauser et al. (2020) and others use the term “preferential ascertainment.”)
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If the degree of preferential testing in a particular sample is of known magnitude,
bias adjustment can be achieved by appropriately altering the estimated rate of in-
fection and its uncertainty interval. However, the degree of preferential testing is no
doubt difficult to ascertain and likely highly variable across different jurisdictions. An
open question is whether or not it is possible to reliably estimate the IFR without
any specific knowledge about the degree to which the data are biased by preferential
testing (Q1). If not, should we rely only on select samples for which testing is represen-
tative and ignore the vast majority of available data? (Q2) In this paper, we address
these two important questions by considering a simple Bayesian hierarchical model for
estimation of the IFR.
Bayesian models have been previously used in similar situations. For example,
Presanis et al. (2009) conduct Bayesian inference to estimate the severity of pandemic
H1N1 influenza; see also Presanis et al. (2011). More recently, Rinaldi and Paradisi
(2020), and Hauser et al. (2020) employ Bayesian methods for estimating the severity
of COVID-19 from early data from China and Italy. In order to address preferential
testing bias, Hauser et al. (2020) apply susceptible-exposed-infected-removed (SEIR)
compartmental models to age-stratified data and, in order to establish parameter
identifiability, assume that all cases of infected patients aged 80 years and older are
confirmed cases. The Bayesian model we propose is more general and allows one to
obtain appropriate point and interval estimates for the IFR with varying degrees of
prior knowledge about the magnitude of preferential testing and the distribution of
other explanatory factors (e.g. age, minority status).
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce required notation,
discuss distributional assumptions and review key issues of identifiability. In Section 3,
we formulate our Bayesian model and present a small illustrative example. In Section
4, we describe how the model can be scaled for larger populations and present results
from a simulation study. In Section 5, we go over potential model extensions as well
as model limitations. Finally, we conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of how the
model could be used for an analysis of COVID-19 data and return to the questions of
interest, Q1 and Q2.
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2. Notation, distributions, and issues of (un)identifiability
2.1. Notation and distributions
Let us begin by describing the data and defining some basic notation. Suppose we
have data from K groups (i.e., countries or jurisdictions) from a certain fixed period
of time. For group k in 1, . . . ,K, let:
• Pk be the population size (i.e., the total number of individuals at risk of infec-
tion);
• Tk be the total number of people tested;
• CCk be the total number of confirmed cases resulting from the tests; and
• Dk be the total number of observed deaths attributed to COVID-19 infection.
We do not observe the following latent variables. For the k-th group, let:
• Ck, the total number of infected people (cases) in the population;
• IRk, be the true infection rate (proportion of the population which is infected),
which is the expected value of Ck/Pk;
• IFRk, be the true underlying infection fatality rate (IFR), which is the expected
value of Dk/Ck.
We assume that:
Ck ∼ Binom(Pk, IRk), (1)
Dk|Ck ∼ Binom(Ck, IFRk), (2)
where, in the k-th group, the unknown number of infections, Ck, and the known
number of deaths, Dk, each follow a binomial distribution. Note that there are latent
variables on both the left hand side and the right hand side of (1).
Suppose that, for each population, CCk is recorded, instead of Ck. Even in the
absence of preferential testing, CCk will be smaller than Ck because not everyone is
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tested. In other words, the confirmed cases (CC) are a subset of the total cases (C).
We assume that the distribution of the confirmed cases depends only on the actual
infection rate (C/P ) and the testing rate (T/P ) and not on the infection fatality rate
(D/C) or other information. In other words, we assume that the conditional distribu-
tion of (CC|C, T, P,D) is identical to the conditional distribution of (CC|C, T, P ).
This important assumption is similar to the assumption of “non-differential” ex-
posure misclassification in measurement error models and may or may not be realistic;
see De Smedt et al. (2018). For example, COVID-19 is thought to be deadlier amongst
the elderly. If this is true, the non-differential preferentiality assumption would fail if
elderly individuals were just as likely to be infected as others, yet more likely to be
tested.
The goal is to draw inference on the relationship between the number of deaths,D,
and the number of cases, C, having only data on D, CC, P , and T . This is particularly
challenging since the number of confirmed cases in each group may be subject to a
certain unknown degree of preferential testing. Let the degree of preferential testing
correspond to the φ non-centrality parameter, where CCk follows Wallenius’ non-
central hyper-geometric distribution with:
CCk|Ck ∼ NCHyperGeo(Ck, Pk − Ck, Tk, φk). (3)
The hyper-geometric distribution describes the probability of CCk confirmed
cases amongst Tk tests (without any individuals being tested more than once), from
a finite population of size Pk that contains exactly Ck cases. The non-central hyper-
geometric is a generalization of the hyper-geometric distribution whereby, in this case,
testing may be biased so that either cases or non-cases are more likely to be tested.
When φk > 1, cases (i.e., infected individuals) are more likely to be tested than non-
cases (i.e., non-infected individuals); when φk < 1, cases are less likely to be tested
than non-cases. When φk = 1, we have that the probability of being tested is equal for
both cases and non-cases, and the non-central hyper-geometric distribution reduces to
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the standard hyper-geometric distribution. In this parameterization, the φk parameter
can be interpreted as an odds ratio: the odds of a case being tested vs. the odds of a
non-case being tested.
Table 1 provides a small artificial dataset to help illustrate the type of data being
described and the impact of different degrees of preferential testing. In this dataset,
we have K = 12 groups and the (unknown) infection rate varies substantially from
13% to 53%. The unknown infection fatality rate only varies slightly, from 0.017% to
0.022%. Values for φk in this dataset are evenly distributed between 1 and γ + 1, for
four different values of γ = 0, 4, 11, and 22. When γ = 0, the number of true cases
(i.e. actual infections) is approximately 14 times higher than the number of confirmed
cases. In contrast, when γ = 22, the number of true cases is only about 5 times higher
than the number of confirmed cases.
Observed, γ = 0 4 11 22 Unobserved, γ = 4 11 22
k Pk Tk Dk CCk CCk CCk CCk Ck IRk IFRk φk φk φk
1 3061 190 11 24 21 32 27 430 0.140 0.018 1.00 1 1
2 482 43 2 15 11 12 24 99 0.206 0.020 1.36 2 3
3 1882 101 20 32 40 55 74 570 0.303 0.022 1.73 3 5
4 1016 67 2 14 24 33 38 193 0.190 0.017 2.09 4 7
5 1269 109 4 13 34 54 67 201 0.159 0.021 2.45 5 9
6 3670 276 9 53 70 140 162 484 0.132 0.021 2.82 6 11
7 2409 139 7 17 34 70 94 329 0.137 0.019 3.18 7 13
8 1074 81 13 42 65 68 77 565 0.526 0.019 3.55 8 15
9 3868 289 16 60 142 205 247 821 0.212 0.019 3.91 9 17
10 151 13 2 1 5 11 8 24 0.160 0.019 4.27 10 19
11 430 25 1 6 9 16 18 70 0.164 0.019 4.64 11 21
12 429 40 2 11 23 31 33 105 0.245 0.019 5.00 12 23
Table 1. Illustrative Example Data, with varying degrees of preferential sampling, γ = 0, γ = 4, γ = 11, and
γ = 22. R-code to reproduce: https://tinyurl.com/y7gmnpob
2.2. Issues of (un)identifiability
Given the assumptions detailed above, for each of the K groups, there are three un-
known parameters (latent states), IRk, IFRk and φk, that must be estimated for every
two known values (Dk/Pk and CCk/Tk). This suggests that a unique solution may not
be attainable without additional external data. The problem at hand is sufficiently
rich and complex that forming intuition about the information-content of the data is
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challenging.
Here we present an asymptotic argument which lays bare the flow of informa-
tion. Consider a situation in which an infinite amount data are available. In so-called
“asymptotia,” we have that populations are approaching infinite size (i.e., for k in
1,. . . ,K, we have Pk → ∞), and that the number of tests also approaches infinity
(i.e., for k in 1,. . . ,K, we have Tk → ∞). Recall that a hyper-geometric distribu-
tion is asymptotically equivalent to a binomial distribution. As such, we consider the
following:
Dk ∼ Binom(Pk, ak); and
CCk ∼ Binom(Tk, bk),
where ak = IFRk × IRk and bk = 1− (1− IRk)φk .
Note that ak simply follows from the conditional binomial distribution (see ex-
pressions (11)-(14) and explanation in Section 4.1). However, this particular param-
eterization of bk does not emerge from the limit of the non-central hyper-geometric
distribution. As we discuss later in Section 4.1, we have simply chosen a convenient
parameterization for bk with the important connotation that φk = 1 corresponds to
testing at random, but as φk increases, the testing is more preferentially weighted to
those truly infected. For example, with an infection rate of IRk = 0.01, the binomial
sampling probability bk is approximately 10 times larger than the infection rate if
φk = 10, and about 18 times larger if φk = 20.
Presume that the a priori defensible information about the preferential sampling
in the k-th group is expressed in the form
φk ∈ [φk, φ¯k], (4)
i.e., φk and φ¯k are investigator-specified bounds on the degree of preferential sampling
for that jurisdiction. If one is certain that cases are as likely, or at least as likely, to be
tested as non-cases, φk = 1 is appropriate. If testing is known to be entirely random
for the k-th group, one would set φk = φ¯k = 1.
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Note that for fixed (ak, bk), IFRk is a function of φk with the form
IFRk(φk) =
ak
1− (1− bk)(1/φk)
. (5)
Examining (5), knowledge of (ak, bk), in tandem with (4) restricts the set of possible
values for IFRk. In fact it is easy to verify that (5) is monotone in φk, hence the
restricted set is an interval. We write this interval as Ik(ak, bk, φk, φ¯k), or simply as
Ik for brevity. This is the jurisdiction-specific identification interval for IFRk. As we
approach asymptotia for the k-th group, all values inside the interval remain plausible,
while all values outside are ruled out; see Manski (2003). This is the essence of the
partial identification inherent to this problem.
Thinking now about the meta-analytic task of combining information, we envision
that both φk and IRk could exhibit considerable variation across jurisdictions. How-
ever, the variation in IFR could be small, particularly if sufficient jurisdiction-specific
covariates are included (see Section 5.1). That is, after adjustment for a jurisdiction’s
age-distribution, healthcare capacity, and so on, residual variation in IFR could be
very modest. When modeling, we would invoke such an assumption via a prior dis-
tribution. For understanding in asymptotia, however, we simply consider the impact
of an a priori bound on the variability in IFR. Let τ be the standard deviation of
IFR across jurisdictions. Then we presume τ does not exceed an investigator-specified
upper bound of τ¯ , i.e., τ ≤ τ¯ .
The jurisdiction-specific prior bounds on the extent of preferential sampling, and
the prior bound on IFR variation across jurisdictions, along with the limiting signal
from the data in the form of (a, b), gives rise to an identification region for the average
infection fatality rate, IFR = K−1
∑K
k=1 IFRk. Formally, this interval is defined as
I(a, b, φ, φ¯, τ¯) =
{
IFR : τ ≤ τ¯ , IFRk ∈ Ik(ak, bk, φk, φ¯k),∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
}
. (6)
Again, the interpretation is direct: in the asymptotic limit, all values of IFR inside
this interval are compatible with the observed data, and all values outside are not. The
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primary question of interest is whether this interval is narrow or wide under realistic
scenarios, since this governs the extent to which we can learn about IFR from the
data.
In general, evaluating (6) for given inputs is an exercise in quadratic programming
nested within a grid search, hence can be handled with standard numerical optimi-
sation. Details of this formulation are given in the Appendix. However, the special
case of τ¯ = 0 is noteworthy in terms of developing both scientific and mathematical
intuition. Consequently, we explore this case in some depth in what follows.
Scientifically, τ¯ = 0 represents the extreme limit of an a priori assumption that,
possibly after covariate adjustment, IFR is a ‘biological constant’ which does not vary
across jurisdictions. If the prospects for inference are not good when this assumption
holds, they will be even less good under the less strict assumption that the IFR
heterogeneity is small, but not necessarily zero. Mathematically, the case is much
simpler, with (6) reducing to
I(a, b, φ, φ¯, 0) = ∩kIk(ak, bk, φk, φ¯k).
As intuition must have it, without heterogeneity, a putative value for the ‘global’ IFR
is compatible with the observed data if and only if it is compatible with the data from
every jurisdiction individually.
To illustrate, consider a scenario with K = 12 jurisdictions, with a constant
infection fatality rate of 2%, i.e., IFRk = 0.02, for k in 1,...,12. Say that the infection
rates for these jurisdictions lie between 0.132 and 0.526, as per Table 1. Furthermore,
say that the unknown φk values range between 1 and 23, as per the rightmost column
(γ = 22) of Table 1.
Now say the investigator pre-specifies (φk, φ¯k) = (1, 40) for all k. As such, the
a priori bounds are correct, for all jurisdictions. The resulting jurisdiction-specific
identification intervals, Ik, are depicted in the bottom left-hand panel of Figure 1.
(The top and middle left-hand panels correspond to the identical situation but with
φk values listed in the γ = 4 and γ = 11 columns of Table 1 respectively.) Also
9
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Figure 1. Black lines correspond to jurisdiction-specific identification intervals and the green rectangle corre-
sponds to the global identification interval. Left-hand panels correspond to assumption of τ¯ = 0 such the global
identification interval is simply the intersection of the individual intervals. Right-hand panels correspond to τ¯
= 0.002. R-code to reproduce: https://tinyurl.com/yap36pp2
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depicted by the green rectangle is the global identification interval, i.e., the intersection
of the individual intervals. In the present scenario (γ = 22), this is indeed narrow,
ranging from 0.0200 to 0.0328. (For the γ = 4, γ = 11 and γ = 22 scenarios, the
global identification intervals are [0.0200, 0.1419], [0.0200, 0.0606], and [0.0200, 0.0328],
respectively.) Thus, depending on the range and heterogeneity in φk values, it appears
that data can contribute substantial information about the (constant) infection fatality
rate.
As can be seen immediately from Figure 1 (left-hand panels), in the present
example the binding constraints arise from the first and twelfth jurisdictions, which
happen to have the least and most amounts of preferential testing. However, this
pattern does not hold in general. One can easily construct pairs of infection rates for
which the jurisdiction with more preferential testing has a smaller upper endpoint for
Ik and/or a larger lower endpoint. Thus the values of φk alone do not determine which
two jurisdictions will provide the binding information about IFR.
Figure 1 (right-hand panels) shows how the global identification interval is wider
when τ = 0.002. For reference, for the IFR values listed in Table 1, τ = SD(IFR1:12) =
0.00124. For the γ = 4, γ = 11, and γ = 22 scenarios, the global identification intervals
outlined by the green rectangles are [0.0139, 0.1483], [0.0137, 0.0670] and [0.0137,
0.0386], respectively. Details for these calculations are presented in the Appendix.
3. A Bayesian model for small-P data and an illustrative example
3.1. A Bayesian model for small-P data
Bayesian models work well for dealing with partially identifiable models; see Gustafson
(2010). We describe a Bayesian model for the IFR which assumes standard Gaussian
random-effects allowing both the infection rate (IR) and infection fatality rate (IFR)
to vary between populations with a complimentary log-log link function:
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clog-log(IFRk) ∼ N (θ, τ2), (7)
clog-log(IRk) ∼ N (β, σ2), (8)
for k in 1, . . . ,K, where θ is the parameter of primary interest, τ2 represents between
group IFR heterogeneity, β represents the mean cloglog-infection rate, and σ2 is the
variance in infection rates across the K groups.
A Bayesian model begins by specifying a joint probability distribution. For our
unknown parameters of interest (θ, τ2, β, σ2), latent variables (Ck, IFRk, IRk, and
φk, for k in 1,. . . ,K), and aggregate data from K sources (we require data = {Pk, Tk,
CCk, and Dk}, for k in 1,. . . ,K), Bayes theorem states that:
p((θ, τ2,β, σ2,C, IFR, IR, φ)|data) ∝ p(data|θ, τ2, β, σ2,C, IFR, IR, φ) (9)
× p(θ, τ2, β, σ2,C, IFR, IR, φ)
=
( K∏
k=1
p(Dk|IFRk, Ck)p(CCk|Tk, Pk, Ck, φk)p(Ck|Pk, IRk)p(IFRk|θ, τ2)p(IRk|β, σ2)
)
× p(θ)p(τ2)p(β)p(σ2)
K∏
k=1
p(φk).
We have that p(Dk|IFRk, Ck) is defined according to a binomial distribution
as stated in (2), that p(CCk|Tk, Pk, Ck, φk) is defined according to (3), and that
p(Ck|Pk, IRk) is defined by (1). We also have that p(IFRk|θ, τ2) and p(IRk|β, σ2)
are defined according to (7) and (8) respectively. We are left to define prior distribu-
tions for the unknown parameters: θ, τ2, β, σ2, and φk, for k in 1, . . . ,K.
Defining prior distributions is often controversial, as their choice can substantially
influence the posterior when few data are available; see Lambert et al. (2005); Berger
(2013); Burke et al. (2018); Gelman et al. (2006). We proceed by adopting flat priors
on the probability scale to induce “uninformative” priors on the θ and β parameters
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(i.e., uniform priors on the inverse-clog-log scale) and weakly-informative half-normal
priors for the τ and σ parameters. We fully expect that the true underlying infection
rate will vary importantly across populations, while the true underlying IFR should be
less variable, (especially after accounting for population level sources of heterogeneity;
see Section 5.1). The priors are set accordingly. We consider the following:
iclog-log(θ) ∼ Uniform(0, 1);
iclog-log(β) ∼ Uniform(0, 1);
τ ∼ half-N (0, 0.01); and:
σ ∼ half-N (0, 1).
The only remaining component is p(φ) =
∏
k p(φk). Knowledge about the magni-
tude of preferential testing in a given population may come from a variety of sources,
yet may be difficult to quantify. Let us begin by assuming that, for k = 1, . . . ,K, φk
is greater than 1, but otherwise of unknown magnitude. It also seems reasonable to
assume a certain degree of heterogeneity for φk across the K populations since the
degree to which testing is available and randomly allocated might vary considerably.
We therefore define a uniform prior such that:
φk ∼ Uniform(1, 1 + γ), for k in 1,...K; (10)
and: γ ∼ Exp(λ = 0.5). The prior specification therefore assumes that the uniform
range of possible values for φk is itself unknown. Setting λ = 0.5 implies that, a
priori, a reasonable value for the φk odds ratio is 2, (i.e., since E(γ) = 1/λ and
E(φk) = (1 + (γ + 1))/2).
In some scenarios, it might be conceivable to have a subset of groups for which φk
is known and equal to 1 (i.e., to have data from some samples where testing is known
to be random). Without loss of generality, suppose this subset is the first k
′
studies,
such that for k = 1, . . . , k
′
, we have φk = 1. In a situation where testing is known to
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be random for all groups, k
′
= K.
We emphasize that the performance of any Bayesian estimator will depend on
the choice of priors. The priors described represent a scenario where there is little to
no a priori knowledge about the θ, β, and φ model parameters. Inference would
no doubt be improved should more informative priors be specified based on probable
values for each of these parameters. We briefly consider the impact of priors in the
simulation study in Section 4.3, where we look to different values for λ.
3.2. Illustrative example
Let us illustrate the proposed model with the simple example dataset introduced
earlier in Table 1. The illustrative dataset considers K = 12 groups with average
populations of 2,000 individuals (Pk obtained from a NegBin(2000, 1) distribution).
The data were simulated such that, across all 12 groups, the expected overall IFR
is 2% (i.e., icloglog(θ) = 0.02; θ = −3.90), and the expected overall IR is 20% (i.e.,
icloglog(β) = 0.20; β = −1.50). A certain degree of variability between populations
was allowed by selecting τ2 = 0.005 and σ2 = 0.25. The testing rate for each population
was obtained from a Uniform(0.01, 0.10) distribution so that the number of tests in
each population ranged from 1% of individuals to 10%.
Note that the number of observed deaths is relatively small ranging from 1 to 20.
The number of confirmed cases differs with differing degrees of preferential testing. The
φk values were set to be equally spaced from 1 to γ + 1 and the number of confirmed
cases were then simulated from Wallenius’ non-central hyper-geometric distribution
(see Fog (2008)) as in equation (3) with either no preferential testing (γ = 0), “mild”
preferential testing (γ = 4), “modest” preferential testing (γ = 11), or “substantial”
preferential testing (γ = 22).
We fit the model (M1) as detailed in Section 3.1, where k
′
= 0, and K = 12,
and also fit the model (M{γ=0}) where γ = 0 is fixed, corresponding to a situation in
which one assumes that none of the populations are subject to any preferential testing.
Each model is fit using JAGS (just another Gibbs’ sampler) (Kruschke, 2014), with 5
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Truth M1 M{γ=0}
2.5% 50% 97.5% 2.5% 50% 97.5%
γ = 0 θ -3.902 -4.000 -3.511 -2.808 -4.051 -3.821 -3.577
β -1.500 -2.567 -1.745 -1.161 -1.775 -1.401 -1.034
τ 0.071 0.000 0.067 0.193 0.000 0.070 0.198
σ 0.50 0.290 0.548 0.899 0.308 0.545 0.866
γ 0 0.001 1.120 5.636
γ = 4 θ -3.902 -4.347 -3.796 -3.213 -4.538 -4.306 -4.071
β -1.500 -2.108 -1.426 -0.649 -1.213 -0.800 -0.391
τ 0.071 0.000 0.082 0.222 0.000 0.115 0.255
σ 0.50 0.385 0.639 1.037 0.397 0.648 1.014
γ 4 0.006 3.132 8.150
γ = 11 θ -3.902 -4.511 -4.092 -3.662 -4.978 -4.723 -4.482
β -1.500 -1.646 -1.065 -0.436 -0.621 -0.218 0.191
τ 0.071 0.000 0.079 0.224 0.000 0.175 0.310
σ 0.50 0.341 0.626 1.048 0.397 0.651 1.015
γ 11 1.732 5.968 12.304
γ = 22 θ -3.902 -4.797 -4.349 -3.946 -5.135 -4.894 -4.625
β -1.500 -1.426 -0.802 -0.152 -0.406 0.044 0.447
τ 0.071 0.001 0.096 0.248 0.008 0.187 0.331
σ 0.50 0.391 0.673 1.082 0.422 0.699 1.066
γ 22 1.558 7.023 15.644
Table 2. Illustrative Example Data - Posterior medians and 95% HPD credible intervals. R-code to reproduce:
https://tinyurl.com/yb2gf9nk
independent chains, each with 500,000 draws (20% burnin, thinning of 50). The results,
including posterior medians and highest posterior density (HPD) 95% credible intervals
(CI), are listed in Table 2. In the Appendix, Figures 4-11 plot diagnostics for the
MCMC; the prior-posterior overlap numbers suggest that the data carry substantial
information content about the magnitude of the φ variables.
When γ = 0, note that the 95% CI for θ is much wider with M1 compared
to with M{γ=0}. This reflects the additional uncertainty of not knowing about the
absence/presence of preferential testing. Otherwise, when γ > 0, we see that ignoring
preferential testing has significant consequences. With the M{γ=0} model, the 95% CI
for θ fails to include the target when γ > 0. When γ = 22, the M1 model also fails
to include the target within the 95% CI for θ. This suggests that, with limited data,
there is an upper bound on the degree of preferential testing for which the model can
adjust.
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4. A Bayesian model for large-P data, MCMC details, and a simulation
study
4.1. A Bayesian model for large-P data
When populations are large, we can simplify our model (in order to reduce the compu-
tational complexity), by replacing the non-central hyper-geometric distribution with
a binomial distribution as follows:
CCk ∼ Binom(Tk, 1− (1− IRk)φk), (11)
Ck ∼ Binom(Pk, IRk), (12)
Dk|Ck ∼ Binom(Ck, IFRk), (13)
for k in 1, . . . ,K. Note that the φk parameter above no longer corresponds to an odds
ratio, yet the interpretation is similar. We could have considered substituting the non-
central hyper-geometric distribution in (3) with a Gaussian asymptotic approximation
to the non-central hyper-geometric (Hannan and Harkness, 1963; Stevens, 1951). How-
ever, the Gaussian approximation requires solving quadratic equations and therefore,
might not necessarily help reduce the the computational complexity of our model; see
Sahai and Khurshid (1995).
We can further simplify by marginalizing over the cases. Since we have the distri-
bution of Ck and the conditional distribution of Dk given Ck, and since both of these
are binomials, we have that unconditionally:
Dk ∼ Binom(Pk, IFRk × IRk). (14)
For our unknown parameters of interest (θ, τ2, β, σ2), latent variables (IFRk,
IRk, and φk, for k in 1,. . . ,K), and aggregate data from K sources (we require data
= {Pk, Tk, CCk, and Dk}, for k in 1,. . . ,K), Bayes’ theorem states that:
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p((θ, τ2,β, σ2, IFR, IR, φ)|data) ∝ p(data|θ, τ2, β, σ2, IFR, IR, φ) (15)
× p(θ, τ2, β, σ2, IFR, IR, φ)
=
( K∏
k=1
p(Dk|IFRk, IRk, Pk)p(CCk|Tk, IRk, φk)p(IFRk|θ, τ2)p(IRk|β, σ2)
)
× p(θ)p(τ2)p(β)p(σ2)
K∏
k=1
p(φk),
where p(Dk|IFRk, IRk, Pk) and p(CCk|Tk, IRk, φk) are defined by binomial distri-
butions detailed in (14) and (11) respectively. We also have p(IFRk|θ, τ2) and
p(IRk|β, σ2) defined according to (7) and (8) respectively, and priors defined as in
Section 3.
4.2. MCMC details
For the large-P model, MCMC mixing can be slow because different combinations
of φk, cloglog(IRk) and cloglog(IFRk) can yield similar model probabilities. This is
related to the identifiability issues discussed in Section 2.2. To improve mixing, we
wrote this model in the nimble package (de Valpine et al., 2017), which supports an
extension of the modeling language used in JAGS and makes it easy to configure
samplers and provide new samplers. Using nimble, we applied two sampling strategies
for the trio (φ, cloglog(IRk), cloglog(IFRk)) for each k in 1, . . . ,K. The details of these
are provided in the Appendix.
4.3. Simulation study
We conducted a simple simulation study in order to better understand the operating
characteristics of the proposed model. Specifically, we wished to evaluate the frequen-
tist coverage of the CI for θ, and investigate the impact of the chosen prior for the
magnitude of preferential testing (i.e., the impact of selecting different values for λ). As
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emphasized in Gustafson et al. (2009), the average frequentist coverage of a Bayesian
credible interval, taken with respect to the prior distribution over the parameter space,
will equal the nominal coverage. This mathematical property is unaffected by the lack
of identification. However, the variability of coverage across the parameter space is
difficult to anticipate and could be highly affected by the choice of prior. For example,
we might expect that, in the absence of preferential testing (i.e., when γ = 0), coverage
will be lower than the nominal rate. However, if this is the case, coverage will need to
be higher than the nominal rate when γ > 0, so that the “average” coverage (taken
with respect to the prior distribution over the parameter space) is nominal overall.
We simulated datasets with K = 20 and k
′
= 8. For k = 1, . . . , 8, population sizes
were obtained from a NegBin(20000, 1) distribution and for k = 9, . . . , 20, population
sizes were obtained from a NegBin(200000, 1) distribution. Parameter values were as
in the illustrative example: θ = cloglog(0.02) = −3.90, β = cloglog(0.20) = −1.50,
τ2 = 0.005 and σ2 = 0.25. The testing rate for each population was obtained from a
Uniform(0.01, 0.10) distribution so that the proportion of tested individuals in each
population ranged from 1% to 10%. We considered eight values of interest for γ: 0, 1, 4,
11, 22, 34, 52, and 80; and three different values of interest for λ: 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75.
The number of confirmed cases (CCk) were simulated from Wallenius’ non-central
hyper-geometric distribution as in expression (3).
First we ran the simulation study with the 12 “unknown” φk values, for k in 9,
..., 20, set to be evenly spaced between 1 and γ + 1, (as in the illustrative example)
with γ assuming one of the eight values of interest (Study A). We also repeated the
entire simulation study with the 12 “unknown” φk values, for k in 9, ..., 20, simulated
from a Uniform(1, γ + 1) distribution (Study B).
We fit three models to each unique dataset: M1, M2, and M3. All three models
follow the same large-P framework detailed in Section 4.1 but consider different subsets
of the data. The M1 model uses only data from the samples for which φk is unknown,
i.e., {Pk, Tk, CCk, and Dk} for k in 9, ..., 20. The M2 model considers the data from
all the groups, i.e., {Pk, Tk, CCk, and Dk} for k in 1, ..., 20. Finally, the M3 model
uses only data from the samples for which φk is known, i.e., {Pk, Tk, CCk, and Dk} for
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k in 1, ..., 8. To be clear, the M2 and M3 models include the assumption of (correctly)
known φk for k = 1, . . . , 8.
We simulated 200 unique datasets and, for each, fit the three different models.
The M1 and M2 models are fit 24 different times (= 3 × 8) for each unique dataset,
each time with λ assuming one of the three values of interest, and with one of the
eight different sets of CCk numbers (for k in 9, ..., 20), corresponding to the eight γ
values. For each case, we recorded the width of the 90% HDP CI for θ and whether or
not the CI contained the target value of cloglog(0.02) = −3.90.
We specifically chose to conduct 200 simulation runs so as to keep computing time
within a reasonable limit while also reducing the amount of Monte Carlo standard error
to a reasonably small amount (for looking at coverage with 1−α = 0.90, Monte Carlo
SE will be approximately
√
0.90(1− 0.90)/200 ≈ 0.02); see Morris et al. (2019). For
each simulation scenario, we used nimble to obtain 100,000 MCMC draws from the
posterior (20% burn-in, thinning of 50).
Figure 2 plots the simulation study results for Study A, where the φk values are
evenly spaced between 1 and γ + 1. First of all, we note that coverage for model M3
(based on only the unbiased data) is 0.910 as expected; see dotted black line on Figure
2 lower-left panel. The average interval width is 0.197; see dotted black line on Figure
2 lower-right panel. Results from the M1 model (upper panels, dashed lines) show that
the model provides at or above nominal coverage for a wide range of γ values. This
suggests that appropriate estimates are achievable even in the presence of a substantial
and unknown amount of preferential testing. When γ = 11, the odds (on average) for
a case to be tested are more than six times the odds for a non-case (the average φk
value is equal to (1 + (γ + 1))/2), and yet the model is able to appropriately adjust.
Results also point to a bias-variance trade-off with regards to one’s choice for λ. The
smaller the value of λ, the more robust the model is to a potentially large degree of
preferential testing. The price of this additional robustness is greater uncertainty, i.e.,
a wider credible interval.
Results from the M2 and M3 models suggest that for a given range of γ values, the
M2 model (which makes use of the additional “non-representative” data) is preferable
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Figure 2. Simulation study results for Study A. Left-hand panels correspond to frequentist coverage and
right-hand panels plot average interval width. The dotted lines corresponds to the M1 model, the solid lines
correspond to the M2 model and the dashed line corresponds to the M3 model. R-code to reproduce: https:
//tinyurl.com/y9dfxcno
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Figure 3. Simulation study results for Study B. Left-hand panels correspond to frequentist coverage and
right-hand panels plot average interval width. The dotted lines corresponds to the M1 model, the solid lines
correspond to the M2 model and the dashed line corresponds to the M3 model. R-code to reproduce: https:
//tinyurl.com/yc2z776c
to the M3 model which only uses data from those samples where testing is known to
be representative/random. For instance, the M3 model provides average coverage of
0.910, and an average interval width of 0.197. In contrast, when γ = 4 and λ = 0.5,
the M2 model provides average coverage of 0.915, and an average interval width of
0.183. However, there is a limit to the “added value” that the “non-representative”
data provide. For example, for γ = 80, M3 intervals are narrower compared to M2
intervals (for all λ).
Finally, note that overall the interval width is much narrower for M2 relative to
M1 (compare dashed lines in lower-right panel to those in upper-right panel of Figure
2) which confirms that the k
′
= 8 representative samples are very valuable for reducing
the uncertainty around θ. With regards to the COVID-19 pandemic, this emphasizes
the importance of conducting some amount of “unbiased testing” even if the sample
sizes are relatively small; see Cochran (2020).
Figure 3 plots the simulation study results for Study B, where the φk values
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were simulated from a Uniform(1, 1 + γ). In this study, for a given dataset, we do
not necessarily have a wide range between the lowest and highest φk values. Based
on the identifiability issues discussed in Section 2.2, we might therefore anticipate
that appropriate inference is more challenging. Looking at the results with regards to
coverage, this intuition appears to be correct. However, note that the M2 model is still
able to provide at or above nominal coverage for most of the γ values we considered.
5. Model extensions and model limitations
5.1. Including covariates to improve model inference
The proposed model can be expanded in several different ways. For example, there
are a number of factors that are correlated with the probability of becoming infected
with SARS-Cov-2, the probability of being tested, the accuracy of the test, and the
probability of dying from infection. Assuming these covariates are well specified at the
group level, one could easily adjust the model accordingly to reduce unexplained vari-
ability. Suppose that X[1]k, ..., X[p]k are p different group-level covariates that explain
the k-th group’s infection rate, and that Z[1]k, ..., Z[q]k are q different covariates that
explain the k-th group’s IFR. Then these can be incorporated as follows:
clog-log(IRk) ∼ N (β0 + β1X[1]k + . . .+ βpX[p]k, σ2), (16)
clog-log(IFRk) ∼ N (θ0 + θ1Z[1]k + . . .+ θqZ[q]k, τ2). (17)
With regards to the infection rate (IR), time since first reported infection and
time between first reported infection to imposition of social distancing measures might
be predictive (Anderson et al., 2020). Other, potentially less obvious, covariates could
also be included for IR, see Stephens-Davidowitz (2020).
Age is a key factor for explaining the probability of COVID-19-related death.
One might therefore consider median age of each group as a predictor for the IFR, or
perform analyses that are stratified by different age groups (Onder et al., 2020). The
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latter strategy has, for instance, been recommended to make accurate predictions for
respiratory infections (Pellis et al., 2020).
To illustrate, let us briefly consider the possibility that, for each population, one
has age stratified data. Suppose one has {P agek , T agek , CCagek , and Dagek }, for age in
{0− 30 years, 30− 60 years, 60− 80 years, ≥ 80 years}, and for k in 1, . . . ,K. Then,
including the covariates and a simple random effect can accommodate as follows:
clog-log(IFRagek ) ∼ N (θ0 +θ1I{age=‘30−60′}+θ2I{age=‘60−80′}+θ3I{age=‘≥80′}+ηk, σ2),
(18)
where: ηk ∼ N (0, ω2), for k in 1, . . . ,K, with unknown ω2 variance.
Finally, note that including data from serology studies (Winter and Hegde, 2020)
will be crucial to inform the IR. If data from multiple serology studies are available
from a single jurisdiction (or from several different regions within the jurisdiction), the
proposed model could incorporate all these by including appropriate covariates and
random effects.
5.2. Model limitations
Estimation of the IFR is very challenging due to the fact that it is a ratio of numbers
where both the numerator and denominator are subject to a wide range of biases. Our
proposed model only seeks to address one particular type of bias pertaining to the
denominator: the bias in the number of cases due to preferential testing. With this in
mind, we wish to call attention to several other important sources of bias.
Cause of death information, compiled from death certificates, may not list SARS-
CoV-2 as a contributing factor and certain jurisdictions may not have adopted the
International Form of Medical Certificate of Cause of Death or have adopted the WHO
guidelines on registering COVID-19-related deaths (WHO, 2020). As such, reported
statistics on the number of deaths may be very inaccurate. To overcome this issue,
many suggest looking to “excess deaths,” by comparing aggregate data for all-cause
deaths from the time during the pandemic to the years prior (Leon et al., 2020). Using
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this approach and a simple Bayesian binomial model, Rinaldi and Paradisi (2020) are
able to obtain IFR estimates without relying on official (possibly inaccurate) data for
the number of COVID-19 deaths.
Some people who are currently sick will eventually die of the disease, but have not
died yet. Due to the delay between disease onset and death, the number of confirmed
and reported COVID-19 deaths at a certain point in time will not reflect the total
number of deaths that will occur among those already infected (right-censoring). This
will result in the number of recorded deaths underestimating the true risk of death.
The denominator of the IFR must be the number of cases with known outcomes. Using
time-series survival data or a defensible prior on the time from infection to death, the
Bayesian model could be expanded to account for this additional source of uncertainty.
The model, as currently proposed, also fails to account for the (unknown) num-
ber of false positive and false negative tests. When both the test specificity and the
infection rate is low, false positives can substantially inflate estimates of infection rate
and as a consequence, the IFR could be biased downwards. In principle, the model
could accommodate for this by specifying priors for the sensitivity and specificity. In
fact, Bayesian inference is known to be an excellent tool for adjusting for unknown
testing uncertainty (Srinivasan et al., 2012; Burstyn et al., 2020).
Finally, because the model uses data that are aggregated at the group level, esti-
mates are potentially subject to ecological bias. While including group-level covariates
may help reduce variability in the estimates, adjustment using group-level covariates
can also lead to biased, misleading results (Li and Hua, 2020; Berlin et al., 2002). While
ecological analyses can be useful for developing hypotheses (Pearce, 2000) and may be
needed to make rapid use of publicly available surveillance data for inference during
an epidemic, they cannot be used to make reliable inferences at the participant level.
Sharing de-identified participant-level data as rapidly and widely as possible, in keep-
ing with ethical and legal standards, is central to epidemic response (The GloPID-R
Data Sharing Working Group, 2018).
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6. Conclusion
6.1. Thoughts on an application for COVID-19 IFR
Reducing uncertainty around the severity of COVID-19 is of great importance to
policy makers and the public (Ioannidis, 2020; Lipsitch, 2020). Comparisons between
the COVID-19 and seasonal influenza IFRs have impacted the timing and degree of
social distancing measures and highlighted the need for more accurate estimates for
the severity of both viruses (Faust, 2020). The current lack of clarity means that policy
makers are unsure if cross-population differences (i.e., due to large τ2) are related to
clinically relevant heterogeneity or to spurious heterogeneity driven by testing and
reporting biases (i.e., due to large γ).
Existing efforts to understand the distribution of SARS-CoV-2 infection at the
population level are unfortunately met by recruiting challenges (Gudbjartsson et al.,
2020; Bendavid et al., 2020), leading to an over representation of people who are
concerned about their exposure and/or an under representation of individuals who are
self-quarantining, isolating, or hospitalized because of the virus. As of May 2020, non-
preferential testing has only been reported for limited populations where the entire
population was tested, including the Diamond Princess Cruise Ship, four US prisons
where all inmates and staff were tested, and the town of Vo’, Italy (Field Briefing, 2020;
Lavezzo et al., 2020; So and Sminth, 2020; Aspinwall and Neff, 2020). Of these, only the
Diamond Princess Cruise Ship had made testing and outcome data publicly available
at the age-group level at the time of publication (Field Briefing, 2020); (participant-
level age and test result data are available for Vo’, Italy, but no outcome data were
listed at the time of publication). Munich, Germany has undertaken a population-
representative prospective cohort study where researchers randomly selected addresses
and all household members will be asked to complete COVID-19-related questions and
serologic testing (Radon et al., 2020). While the research protocol does not specify
when, whether, or how the data would be made publicly available, the Munich data
will be an important resource as perhaps the first large-scale, population-representative
dataset that is not affected by preferential testing.
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In an ideal world (for purposes of estimating the IFR), ample data free from
preferential testing bias would be available for analysis. Unfortunately, in reality, such
data are in scarce supply (Goodman and Shah, 2020). Our Bayesian model suggests
that we can make headway nonetheless. Data from jurisdictions that are unrepresen-
tative can still be used to obtain informative estimates of the IFR and can help reduce
uncertainty when used alongside the limited representative data available.
6.2. Final thoughts
In the Introduction, we identified two important questions. First (Q1), is it possible to
reliably estimate the IFR without any specific knowledge about the degree to which the
data are biased by preferential testing? And secondly (Q2), must we only rely on select
samples for which testing is representative and ignore the vast majority of available
data? The proposed Bayesian model suggests that reliable estimation of the IFR at
the group level is indeed possible when existing data do not reflect a random sample
from the target population, and when limited knowledge is available about the likely
magnitude of preferential testing. Importantly, the key to (partial) identifiability is
sufficient heterogeneity in the degree of preferential testing across groups and sufficient
homogeneity in the group-specific IFR. We also saw that, one need not ignore the vast
majority of available data that may be biased by preferential testing. This data, with
appropriate adjustment, can supplement any available representative data in order to
sharpen the inference.
In a typical situation of drawing inference from a single sample, obtaining ap-
propriate estimates if that sample is biased by preferential testing is challenging if
not impossible without some sort of external validation data. Intuition suggests that
one might only be able to do a sensitivity analysis with respect to the impact of bias
and indeed, applying prior distributions for the degree of preferential testing and pro-
ceeding with Bayesian inference is often regarded as a probabilistic form of sensitivity
analysis (see, for instance, Greenland (2005)). What is perhaps less intuitive, and what
we demonstrated with the proposed IFR analysis, is that, if one has multiple different
samples of biased data, each subject to a different degree of bias, the “heterogene-
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ity of bias” can inform what overall adjustment is required for appropriate inference.
Future work will investigate whether this principle can be used to derive appropriate
estimates in a meta-analysis where individual studies are subject to varying degrees
of bias due to unobserved confounding or measurement error.
Acknowledgments:
This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and inno-
vation programme under ReCoDID grant agreement No 825746 and by the Canadian
Institutes of Health Research, Institute of Genetics (CIHR-IG) under Grant Agreement
No 01886-000. We also wish to thank Joe Watson for his input early on and expertise
on preferential sampling.
Code for all models, data, and analysis is available at:
https://github.com/harlanhappydog/COVID19IFR
7. Appendix
7.1. Issues of (un)identifiability - (continued)
In section 2.2 we described how the evaluation of the identification interval (6) for
IFR reduces to a simple intersection of intervals, in the special case of τ = 0. Here
we describe the evaluation of (6) for τ > 0, i.e., where a limited heterogeneity in IFR
is permitted.
Recall that quadratic programming constitutes the minimization of a quadratic
function subject to linear constraints, and these may be a mix of equality and inequal-
ity constraints. Let x be a candidate value, which we will test for membership in the
identification interval. To perform this test, we use a standard quadratic programming
package (quadprog, Turlach and Weingessel (2013)) to minimize the quadratic func-
tion V ar(IFR), subject to the equality constraint IFR = x and the 2K inequality
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constraints which restrict IFRk to the interval Ik for each k. By the definition of (6)
then, x belongs in the identification interval if and only if the minimized variance does
not exceed τ2.
Thus a simple grid search over values of x numerically determines the identifica-
tion interval. Note that so long as a and b arise from values of φ within the prescribed
bounds, the underlying value of IFR must belong to the identification interval. Thus
two numerical searches can be undertaken. One starts at the underlying value and
tests successively larger x until a failing value is obtained. The other starts at the
underlying value and does the same, but moving downwards.
In all cases the univariate sampling method was adaptive random-walk
Metropolis-Hastings.
7.2. nimble MCMC details
Using nimble, we applied two sampling strategies for the trio (φk, cloglog(IRk),
cloglog(IFRk)) for each k in 1,. . . ,K. In all cases the univariate sampling method
was adaptive random-walk Metropolis-Hastings. For notation, we drop the subscript
k and define η1 = cloglog(IRk) and η2 = cloglog(IFRk).
First, we included a block sampler on (φ, η1, η2) for each k, along with the
usual univariate samplers on each element of the trio. Second, we included sam-
plers in two transformed coordinate spaces. Define transformed coordinates (z1, z2) =
(h1(η1, η2), h2(η1, η2)) = (exp(η1) + exp(η2), exp(η1)− exp(η2)). (Based on the cloglog
link, the quantities exp(η1) and exp(η2) may be interpreted as continuous time rates.)
Now z1 represents the more strongly identified quantity, so mixing in z2 can be
slow. Hence we wish to improve mixing in the z2 direction. To do so, a sampler can
operate in the (z1, z2) coordinates while transforming the prior such that it is equivalent
in (z1, z2) to what was specified in the original coordinates, (η1, η2). Using P (·) for
priors, we have log(P (z1, z2)) = log(P (η1, η2))− log(|J |), where |J | is the determinant
of the Jacobian of (z1, z2) with respect to (η1, η2). In this case, |J | = 2 exp(η1 + η2).
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The other transformed coordinates used were (z1, z2) = (log(φ)+η1, log(φ)−η1).
Note that log(φ) + η1 = log(− log((1− IR)φ)). Hence z1 represents the more strongly
identified quantity, so we wish to improve mixing by sampling in the z2 direction. We
have the same formulation as above, with |J | = 2/φ.
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Figure 4. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 0. The left panels
report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding posterior
distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red solid line).
The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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Figure 5. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 0. The left panels
report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding posterior
distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red solid line).
The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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Figure 6. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 4. The left panels
report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding posterior
distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red solid line).
The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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Figure 7. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 4. The left panels
report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding posterior
distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red solid line).
The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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Figure 8. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 11. The left panels
report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding posterior
distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red solid line).
The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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Figure 9. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 11. The left panels
report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding posterior
distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red solid line).
The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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Figure 10. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 22. The left
panels report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding
posterior distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red
solid line). The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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Figure 11. A selection of diagnostic plots for the MCMC simulation of the model with γ = 22. The left
panels report trace plots from the posterior to check convergence. The right panels report the corresponding
posterior distribution estimate (black solid line) together with the prior distribution for that parameter (red
solid line). The % overlap reported in red is the PPO (prior-posterior overlap).
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